BRYAN, Judge.
Cheryl Hancock, the plaintiff below, appeals from a judgment dismissing her consolidated actions against the defendants below, Nancy T. Buckner, in her official capacity as the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("the commissioner"); Brandon Hardin, in his official capacity as the director of the Coffee County Department of Human Resources and in his individual capacity ("the director"); and Sharon Ficquette, in her official capacity as general counsel of the Alabama Department of Human Resources and in her individual capacity ("the general counsel"). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On April 29, 2008, Hancock, a merit-system employee of the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("the Alabama DHR") who was assigned to the Coffee County Department of Human Resources ("the Coffee County DHR"), filed the first of two actions in the Montgomery Circuit Court. In her first action, which was docketed as case number CV-08-663 and assigned to Circuit Judge Truman Hobbs, Jr., she sued the commissioner and the director.
On August 25, 2008, Hancock filed a second action in the Montgomery Circuit Court, which was docketed as case number CV-08-1302 and assigned to Circuit Judge Johnny Hardwick. In her second action, Hancock sued the commissioner, the director, and the general counsel.
Contemporaneously with the filing of her complaint in case number CV-08-1302, Hancock filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the commissioner, the director, and the general counsel from holding an administrative disciplinary hearing regarding Hancock and from using Hancock's Alltel and Insight records in the administrative disciplinary hearing pending the adjudication of the merits of her action. Judge Hardwick held a hearing regarding that motion on September 19, 2008. On October 1, 2008, Judge Hardwick entered an order denying Hancock's motion and placing case number CV-08-1302 on the administrative docket.
On October 17, 2008, Hancock petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Hardwick to vacate his October 1, 2008, order, to restore her action to the active docket, and to adjudicate the merits of her claims immediately. After calling for an answer, this court denied Hancock's petition without opinion on November 18, 2008.
Thereafter, the commissioner, the director, and the general counsel moved to dismiss both of Hancock's actions on the ground that they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After entering an order consolidating case number CV-08-663 and case number CV-08-1302, Judge Hobbs held a hearing regarding the motions to dismiss on June 16, 2009. On June 17, 2009, Hancock filed a pleading titled "Supplemental Submission to Court Clarifying Plaintiff's Legal Position." That pleading stated, in pertinent part:
Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 260 (Ala.2003).
Hancock first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim seeking a judgment declaring that the commissioner and the director lacked statutory authority to subpoena Hancock's Alltel and Insight records ("the statutory-authority claim"). Although the trial court did not specify which ground or grounds mentioned in its judgment was the basis for its dismissal of Hancock's consolidated actions, Hancock argues that the trial court erred if it based
In City of Graysville v. Glenn, 46 So.3d 925 (Ala.2009), the supreme court stated:
46 So.3d at 929.
In the case now before us, Hancock's statutory-authority claim sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a statute and it raised "`only questions of law and not matters requiring administrative discretion or an administrative finding of fact.'" City of Graysville v. Glenn, 46 So.3d at 929 (quoting Ex parte Lake Forest Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 603 So.2d 1045, 1046-47 (Ala.1992)). Therefore, we conclude that Hancock's statutory-authority claim was not barred by the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine. See City of Graysville v. Glenn. Consequently, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim. See Department of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Coosa River Basin Initiative, Inc.
Hancock also argues that the trial court erred if it dismissed her statutory-authority claim on the ground that she had not made the Alabama DHR a party to her action. Hancock cited both § 41-22-10, Ala.Code 1975, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, § 6-6-220 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, as statutory bases for her statutory-authority claim. Although the literal language of § 41-22-10 requires that the agency be made a party to an action brought pursuant to that statute, the supreme court has held that § 41-22-10 is to be liberally construed. See Department of Envtl. Mqmt. v. Coosa River Basin Initiative, Inc., 826 So.2d at 117. Moreover, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not require that the agency be made a party to an action brought pursuant to it, and the Declaratory Judgment Act is a valid statutory
Hancock also argues that the trial court erred if it dismissed her statutory-authority claim on the ground that it could not determine what relief that claim was seeking because, she says, that claim clearly stated that it sought a judgment declaring that the commissioner and the director lacked statutory authority to subpoena her Alltel and Insight records. Hancock's statutory-authority claim asked the trial court to "[e]nter a declaratory judgment declaring that the [commissioner and the director] unlawfully obtained [Hancock's] personal cellular telephone records from ALLTEL Corporation" and to "[e]nter a declaratory judgment declaring that the [commissioner and the director] unlawfully obtained privileged, non-public information of or concerning [Hancock] from Insight Treatment Program, Inc." We conclude that Hancock's complaint adequately indicated that the relief she was seeking included a judgment declaring that the commissioner and the director lacked statutory authority to subpoena her Alltel and Insight records.
Hancock also argues that the trial court erred if it dismissed her statutory-authority claim on the ground that Judge Hardwick had already ruled on it because, she says, the record establishes that Judge Hardwick had not ruled on it. Judge Hardwick's October 1, 2008, order entered in case number CV-08-1302 denied Hancock's motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the commissioner, the director, and the general counsel from holding an administrative disciplinary hearing regarding Hancock and from using Hancock's Alltel and Insight records at her administrative disciplinary hearing pending the adjudication of the merits of her action; it did not rule on her claim seeking a judgment declaring that the commissioner and the director lacked statutory authority to subpoena Hancock's Alltel and Insight records. Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Hardwick's October 1, 2008, order did not constitute a valid ground for dismissing Hancock's statutory-authority claim.
Accordingly, the record does not establish that there is no set of facts Hancock could prove that would entitle her to relief on her statutory-authority claim. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it dismissed that claim. See Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d at 260. Although Hancock also presents argument regarding the merits of her statutory-authority claim, in reviewing the dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim, "[t]his Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether the plaintiff may possibly prevail." Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d at 260. Therefore, we express no opinion regarding the merits of Hancock's statutory-authority claim.
Hancock next argues that the trial court erred insofar as it dismissed her claim seeking a judgment declaring that her Alltel and Insight records were not admissible in her administrative disciplinary hearing ("Hancock's evidence-admissibility claim"). A hearing officer in an administrative hearing has discretion regarding the admission of evidence and is not bound by the strict rules of evidence. See § 41-22-13, Ala.Code 1975, and Horn v. State Bd. of Exam'rs in Counseling, 689 So.2d 93,
Hancock also argues that the trial court erred insofar as it dismissed her claim seeking a judgment declaring that the disciplinary proceeding against Hancock constituted extortion and an attempt to discipline Hancock for a nonmerit-based reason. However, that claim did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine. See City of Graysville v. Glenn. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of that claim because it was barred by the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine. Id.
Hancock has not argued that the trial court erred in dismissing any of her other claims; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of those claims. See Tucker v. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist., 864 So.2d 317, 319 (Ala.2003) ("`When an appellant fails to properly argue an issue, that issue is waived and will not be considered. Boshell v. Keith, 418 So.2d 89 (Ala. 1982).' Asam v. Devereaux, 686 So.2d 1222, 1224 (Ala.Civ.App.1996).").
In summary, we reverse the judgment of the trial court insofar as it dismissed Hancock's statutory-authority claim; we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects; and we remand the action for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
THOMPSON, P.J., and THOMAS and MOORE, JJ., concur.
PITTMAN, J., concurs in the result, without writing.
(Emphasis added.)